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ABSTRACT
Prior studies on the monitoring role of outside directors tend to be based on the assumption of
interest differences between agents and principals and adhere to arbitrary definitions of board
independence or quality. Using a unique dataset of individual outside directors’ voting activities
on items proposed by managers of Korean public firms between FY2010 and FY2014, we
investigate whether outside directors play an effective role in mitigating agency problems,
without such assumption and arbitrary definitions. We find that outside directors can provide
effective monitoring by expressing strong dissension, such as disagreeing, withdrawing their
votes, or holding their votes on managers’ proposals. Specifically, such dissension tends to relate
to higher firm performance, and this finding is robust to alternative measures of performance and
estimation methods.
Keywords: Korea, Corporate Governance, Outside Board of Directors, Dissension, Activism,
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1. Introduction
Academics and market participants have long studied whether corporate governance
creates market value. A common topic in corporate governance studies is the monitoring role of
outside board members. Nonetheless, the importance of outside boards of directors in empirical
studies depends on a number of conditions, such as the definitions of board independence, CEO
power, or directors’ characteristics as well as the implicit assumption that managers and directors
have different interests. For instance, early studies report that outside boards of directors monitor
well and their presence positively relates to fewer agency problems (Brickley and James, 1987;
Weisbach, 1988). However, Byrd and Hickman (1992) point out that too many outside board
members may impede efficient firm decision-making because outsiders may take a more
conservative position and have less information than insiders. Implicit assumptions may obscure
results and different definitions of a particular construct may lead to different or conflicting
findings. Thus, we investigate the monitoring role of outside board members by looking into
what outside directors really do in board meetings.
In this study, we generate a dataset that represents individual outside board members’
votes on each item discussed in every single board meeting from Korean public firms from
FY2010 through FY2014. According to the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, all public firms
are required to have at least 25% of the board as outside members and public firms with asset
value of about US$2 billion or more have to appoint at least three outside directors, and enough
to make up the majority of the board. These regulations are to create an ideal environment for
the outside board of directors to monitor and actively advise firm management. However, many
outside directors are former top government officials or former (or current) top managers at
affiliated firms. Although these directors are characterized as independent and outside directors
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by regulations, their behaviors might not necessarily be those of independent directors or good
monitors. Under such circumstances, it is difficult for an individual outside director to say “No”
to the managers’ proposals. Nonetheless, we find significant cases of outside directors’
dissension during board meetings.
In order to investigate the benefits of outside board of directors’ dissension, we look at
firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q and Market-to-Book ratio. Some managers have
incentives to take as much private benefits from their managerial decisions as possible. However,
if outside directors play the active role of monitor, managers are less likely to engage in such
opportunistic behaviors. Based on the monitoring role of outside board of directors and
managers’ potential opportunistic behaviors, we conjecture that outside board of directors’
dissension to managers’ proposals is more likely to monitor managers effectively and improve
firm performance. It is difficult for outside board members to express opposing opinions during
meetings, not just because CEOs are involved in their appointments, but also because both
managers and outside directors might be connected through other channels, such as work
experience, education, social activities, hometown, or military service. Therefore, we do not
employ the strong assumption of interest differences between outside directors and managers or
arbitrary definitions of outside board of directors’ characteristics and board independence seen in
related studies. Moreover, a firm usually choses the board structure, thus the board structure
could be endogenous to other firm characteristics. Instead, we only consider outside board of
directors’ dissension as an event. By doing so, we can investigate on the clear effect of outside
board of directors’ activities on agency issues without the need to know whether insiders and
outsiders have different interests or whether the definitions of directors’ characteristics are valid.
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This study contributes to the finance literature that discusses the agency problem from the
separation of ownership and management and explores how corporate governance relates to firm
value. We find that outside directors’ active monitoring role can reduce agency cost. In
particular, we generate a unique dataset representing individual directors’ real votes and test
whether outside directors’ dissension can create value. In contrast, most related studies have to
assume that a director who is outsider will monitor and advise well, mainly because data
showing directors’ real activities in the boardroom are generally not available publicly. 1 Many
previous studies shed light on activism of outsiders, i.e., ordinary shareholders having small
amount of ownership, to mitigate agency problems. However, our results imply that it is possible
to find evidence that internal activism can also mitigate agency issues and effectively monitor
managers’ opportunistic behaviors. As an inside activity, outside director’s dissension, can be
understood as an internal activism. In addition, we suggest another type of corporate monitoring
proxy, dissension, based on directors’ opinions rather than directors’ connections or board
composition. 2 This new proxy allows us to provide a more tangible dimension of outside
directors’ activities.

2. Literature review and hypotheses development
Many prior studies point out the benefits of independent board of directors. For example,
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) indicate that board structure is one important factor of
monitoring activity. They show that CEO turnover is more sensitive to performance when the

1

Recently, only a few studies enriched the discussion of real activities in the board meeting room. For example,
Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013) consider the minutes of board meetings and board-committee meetings of 11
Israeli firms to show that boards can be active monitors.
2

Jiang et al. (2016) consider director dissension as an information dissemination tool rather than a monitoring
device.
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board structure is more independent because independent outsiders can monitor managers’
opportunistic behaviors and protect owners’ wealth. Outsiders can also contribute their expertise
and objective evaluation to managers’ day-to-day decision-making. However, the definition of
an independent board of directors is controversial. Hwang and Kim (2009) state that the
conventional definition of an independent director does not clearly distinguish connections
between managers and outside directors. They find that 87% of board members are
conventionally independent, but only 62% of directors are conventionally and socially
independent. Thus, the board composition highly depends on the definition of independence.
Another attribute of a board’s effectiveness is the size of the board. Yet related findings are not
conclusive and some results are contradicting. For instance, Yermack (1996) finds that a smaller
board is more efficient; there is an inverse relation between board’s size and firm value
(measured by Tobin’s Q) as well as board’s size and compensation sensitivity to shareholder
wealth. However, Harris and Raviv (2008) propose a model showing that additional monitoring
from a larger board is more beneficial than problems from the larger board, such as free-riding
behavior.
Board effectiveness studies also include discussions on busy board or interlocking board.
Although there are inconclusive empirical results, a board interlocking has an important role as a
channel of information transmission. Fama and Jensen (1983) claim that the number of outside
directors shows the quality of a board. Large outside board membership implies better ability to
provide advising and monitoring activities based on members’ experiences and knowledge.
Several studies also report positive influences of busy board members. Executives sitting on
outside boards can generate their own networks and share information among them to monitor
and advise managerial board members (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Loderer and Peyer, 2002).
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In addition, busy boards can obtain new management skills and strategies from other managers,
and transmit them to the other firm (Booth and Deli, 1996; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). More
recent findings (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008; Bizjak et al., 2009; Stuart and Yim, 2010) argue that
several types of managerial behaviors, such as investment choices, mergers and acquisitions,
IPO, and tax policy, spread through the social networks and multiple directorships. According to
Bouwman (2011), the directors’ influence on firm decision-making is a “familiarity effect” (page
2358) that generates an “influence effect” (page 2391). These studies have shown that board
members have several roles in the board meeting room and they carry some information through
their social networks, regardless of their perception and whether they have good or bad
information quality.
Responding to the 1997 financial crisis, the Korean government introduced a series of
regulations to reform Korean firms because it believed weak corporate governance to be one of
the main factors that caused the Korean financial crisis. Starting in 1998, all listed Korean firms
are required to have at least 25% of board members as outside directors, and starting in 2001,
large public firms with total assets of about US$2 billion or more have to appoint outside
directors as at least half of the total board members. Several studies reveal that the Korean
government’s new regulations after the financial crisis have a positive impact on corporate
governance. Black et al. (2006a, 2006b) use Korean firm data and report that there is a strong
connection between share price and board with 50% outside board of directors. They also find
that better-governed firms have a lower cost of capital. Joh (2003) and Bae et al. (2002) show
there is a Korean discount because chaebol, Korean conglomerates, have lower profitability and
chaebol’s controlling shareholders enjoy excessive private benefits from control. Baek et al.
(2004) report that firms with greater external ownerships experienced smaller share price
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reductions during the financial crisis. Therefore, corporate governance in a Korean firm is an
important driver in protecting its ordinary shareholders’ rights and improving its financial
transparency.
Dunn (1987) and Vance (1983) suggest that outside directors are arguably in a better
position to monitor and control managers and bring a greater breadth of experience to the firm.
Furthermore, a number of studies show a positive correlation between the number of outside
directors on a board and increased shareholder wealth (Byrd and Hickman, 1992;
Subrahmanyam et al., 1997; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). Consequently, if the presence of
active outside directors enhances the monitoring of managerial decisions, such presence should
also be associated with higher firm performance. Managers have discretion in making decisions,
but they may hesitate to engage in opportunistic decision-making when outside directors stand
against their proposals. Therefore, considering outside director dissension as proxy for director’s
activism, we hypothesize that the presence of such dissension relates to better firm performance:
Hypothesis 1. Firms incurring outside directors’ dissension are more likely to have
higher performance.
We define Dissension as the action of outside directors who disagree with a proposal, withdraw
or hold their vote, or present additional opinions such as agreeing with condition or agreeing
after change, rather than just voting to agree with managers’ proposals during board meetings.
However, it could be the case that the relation between dissension and firm performance depends
on the level of dissension. Thus, we consider two layers of outside directors’ internal activism.
We categorize a firm to have Strong Dissension when the firm incurs outside directors’ strong
oppositions such as disagreeing, withdrawing, or holding in their voting, and a firm to have Mild
Dissension when the firm has outside directors who agree with conditions or agree after changes.
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It is difficult for outside directors to express explicit opposition. This is due not only to
the involvement of the CEO and top managers in outside directors’ appointments, but also to
relationships encountered among top managers and outside directors. 3 However, once top
managers face strong dissension, not just additional opinions, from outside directors, they are
more likely to change their behaviors. Therefore, we make the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Firms incurring outside directors’ strong dissension are more likely to
have higher performance.
A potential concern is that a higher increase in firm performance from the less profitable firms
may dominate and influence the overall empirical results. Whether less profitable firms incurred
dissensions or not, these firms would more likely try to improve their performance in the
subsequent year. Thus, outside directors’ dissension in more profitable firms may relate to firm
performance differently:
Hypothesis 3. Outside directors’ dissension in firms having higher profitability has a
positive marginal effect on firm performance.
We directly observe the real activities of outside directors in corporate monitoring, thus avoiding
the issue of potential endogeneity of board structure to other firm characteristics, such as the firm
performance. However, we cannot ignore that firms having outside directors as majority in the
board may feel more comfortable to express opposition and additional opinions, which may drive
the positive relationship between dissension and firm performance. This is because most larger
firms not only are required to have a majority of outside members in their boards of directors, but
also have a larger potential improvement in firm performance because of their market power.
Therefore, we make an additional hypothesis as follows:
3

Although the SEC 54-5, 191-160 states that outside directors may not have a special relationship with the largest
shareholder or an “important business relationship” with a competitor company, it is common for outside directors
and top managers to have social ties (see Hwang and Kim, 2009).
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Hypothesis 4. Outside board of directors’ dissension in firms having outside directors as
a minority board has a positive marginal effect on firm performance.

3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data and sample
We hand-collected data representing Korean public firms’ outside board of directors’
voting activities during the period FY2010 though FY2014 from the Data Analysis, Retrieval
and Transfer System (DART). 4 In addition to the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, Article
54-4, that requires larger Korean public firms to appoint outside directors as a majority in the
boards, the Korean Commercial Act, Article 542-4(3), and its enforcement, Article 31(4),
mandate firms to disclose the attendance records and voting activities of outside directors to
improve overall corporate governance. Thus, managers have to consider the market reactions
when the voting items and results are delivered to the public. Outside directors also have some
pressure to show their sound decision-making and monitoring activities to the market. While
these new regulations were introduced partially in 2001, they were mandated in 2009, and we
can observe the most comprehensive data from FY2010, the beginning of our sample. The
dataset has information not only on the dissension of each outside director, but also the level of
dissension of each director with items proposed by top managers. The voting results span from
agreement to disagreement with the proposals as follows: Agree, Agree with condition, Agree
after change, Hold, Withdraw, and Disagree. Thus, we can observe which firms experience
dissension, how strong the dissension is, and which types of items stimulate more dissension.

4

DART (http://englishdart.fss.or.kr/about/engAbout1.do) is an electronic system that allows companies to file
disclosures online and a repository of these company filings, provided by the South Korean Government and made
available to investors and other users.
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Using this dataset, this study is free from the strong assumption of the difference in interests
between agents and principals and arbitrary definitions of board independence.
We obtained accounting and financial data from Compustat Global. For 2010, the World
Bank reports a total number of 1,781 of Korean public firms while Compustat Global provides
only 874 firms; between FY2010 and FY2014 there are 1,579 firms. We exclude financial
institutions because they are highly regulated by the government, so their outside boards of
directors may have less room to actively monitor managers than those of other firms. In addition,
some firms have missing or no information of directors’ voting activities in the given period, so
we also exclude firm-year observations with partial information. All accounting and financial
variables are winsorized at the extreme one percentiles to mitigate the potential effects of
outliers. The final sample includes 2,680 firm-year observations from 780 unique firms observed
during the period FY2010 to FY2014.
In this sample, a total of 81 dissensions are observed, including 64 strong dissensions
and 27 mild dissensions; among the 81 firms, most firms have either one of Strong Dissension or
Mild Dissension and only 10 firms have both Strong Dissension and Mild Dissension in the same
fiscal year. The largest case of dissensions, 34.2%, is over investment decisions, such as mergers
and acquisitions, launching new business, expanding overseas operations, or increasing stake
holdings of affiliated firms. The second most frequent occurrence of dissensions, 18.0%, is
related to financing decisions, specifically on providing additional credit to sister firms by using
the firm’s own credit line. Internal governance issue is also one of the most frequent items
incurring dissensions, 11.1%. In addition to these three most frequent items that spark
dissensions, appointment of directors, annual shareholders’ meetings, general business planning,
and legal disputes also stir up disagreements (see Appendix A). However, only 16 firms
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encountered consecutive outside directors’ activism over more than two fiscal years (see
Appendix B). Thus, consecutive dissensions appear not to be typical, implying that either
managers avoid to present consecutive proposals that outside directors may object to or outside
directors avoid to make consecutive dissensions.

3.2. Methodology
To study the relation between outside board of directors’ dissension and firm
performance, we estimate the following baseline model:
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(1)

In Eq. (1), for each firm i in year t, Firm Performance represents Tobin’s Q or Market-to-Book
ratio. Outside Director Dissension is Dissension, Strong Dissension, and/or Mild Dissension,
shown with a binary variable representing outside directors’ monitoring activity. Attributes are
variables commonly used to control for firm attributes in studies investigating the relation
between board of directors and firm performance (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Black et al., 2015).
Governance represents variables to control for overall governance level such as the board size
and the ratio of outside directors. In addition, we control for year and industry fixed effects. All
variables are defined in Table 1.

4. Empirical results
4. 1. Univariate tests
Results from univariate tests of mean differences between firms incurring dissensions and
firms not incurring dissensions are presented in Table 2; the sub-samples are unequally
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distributed by presence of directors’ dissension. There are 81 cases of general dissensions of
outside directors among 2,680 observations, which are very rare. This finding is not surprising
because many studies report that CEOs are involved in the appointment process of outside board
of directors (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999), and top managers and outsiders are not purely
independent (Hwang and Kim, 2009). Although the vast majority of outside directors are not
standing against the agendas proposed by managers, this very small number of directors who
dissent makes it important in this study to test whether outside directors are active in corporate
governance and encourage managers to convey better governance to owners. Both the Tobin’s Q
and Market-to-Book ratio of firms with dissension are greater than those of firms without
dissension, respectively, and the differences between the two groups are statistically significant.
Thus, we would like to test whether this difference is led by the presence of the dissension from
outside directors. Firms with dissensions have also on average larger size, higher leverage, larger
board size, and higher ratio of outside directors; firm size, leverage, board size, and outside
director ratio differences are positive and statistically significant, respectively.

4.2. Multivariate tests
4.2.1. Baseline tests
Table 3 reports results from multiple OLS regressions using Dissension, Strong
Dissension, and/or Mild Dissension as main independent variable(s). The dependent variable is
firm performance represented with Tobin’s Q in Models (1) to (4) and Market-to-Book ratio in
Models (5) to (8). Models (1) and (5) report the results from regressions of firm performance on
Dissension with control for firm attributes and governance variables. All regressions include year
and industry fixed effects and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Dissension has a
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positive and statistically significant association with Tobin’s Q and Market-to-Book ratio. 5
Board Size and Outside Director Ratio have a positive and significant relation with firm
performance, which is consistent with supporting evidence from all related previous studies.
Firm performance is inversely related with firm size and past profitability in this regression,
which is also consistent with prior studies using Korean data (Black et al., 2006a, 2006b). These
results support our first hypothesis that firm having an outside board of director’s dissension is
more likely to have higher performance. This is supportive evidence that outside board of
directors can mitigate manager’s incentive to increase private benefits rather than principals’
wealth.
Models (2) and (6) show the results from OLS regressions of firm performance on strong
dissension by outside board of directors. Strong Dissension is significantly and positively
associated with firm performance at the 1% significance level. This result is expected because
80% of outside directors’ dissensions in the sample are strong dissensions by definition. In order
to test the marginal effect of non-strong dissensions such as of agreement with condition or/and
agreement after changes, we run Models (3) and (7) with Mild Dissension as main independent
variable. Unlike from the previous two analyses, Mild Dissension does not have any statistical
significance at all, although the relations of all other control variables on firm performance are
consistent. In Models (4) and (8), we include both types of dissensions, Strong Dissension and
Mild Dissension in order to confirm the positive and significant relation of Strong Dissension
with Firm Value while controlling for Mild Dissension. 6 The findings are consistent and support
our second hypothesis, implying that only strong dissension from outside directors has a
5

Clustering the standard errors at the firm level also lead to a positive and statistically significant relation between
dissension and firm performance.
6 Although Strong Dissension and Mild Dissension are correlated, their Pearson’s correlation coefficient is relatively
low at 0.229. Thus, we include them in the same regression.
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statistically significant and positive relation with firm performance. All other variables have
similar coefficients and statistical significances as in all previous results.
Overall, outside board of directors can mitigate managers’ opportunistic behaviors with
monitoring and advising activities. However, outside board of directors’ gentle monitoring
activity appears not to be enough to mitigate managers’ opportunistic incentives because only
strong dissension is positively associated with firm performance. This result is novel evidence
that categorizes and shows another layer of dissension and its impact on both our measures of
firm performance. Therefore, in our further investigations, we focus only on Strong Dissension
and its relationship with Tobin’s Q.

4.2.2. Robustness tests
Table 4 reports the results from sub-sample analyses as robustness tests. Prior empirical
studies show that outside board of directors’ dissension is a function of firm characteristics
(Jiang et al., 2016; Ma and Khanna, 2015). Thus, we address the concern that firms having
specific characteristics may drive the main result that outside board of directors’ dissension is
related to firm performance. To do so, we generate two sub-samples based on firm profitability
measured by ROA and two sub-samples based on board composition. Firms that are less
profitable may have higher propensity of dissension and could change their profit momentum
dramatically in the subsequent year. These firms might change their performance a lot and distort
the main result in this study. Firms having a board of directors dominated by outsiders could
have more dissensions and their performance changes may be larger, because in general, larger
firms have more outside board of directors and larger market power.
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Models (1) and (2) of Table 4 show the OLS regressions results for the group of firms
with above-median annual ROA and the group of firms with below-median annual ROA,
respectively. Models (3) and (4) show OLS regression results for the group of firms having
outside board of directors as a majority of board members and the group of firms having outside
board of directors as minority board members, respectively. Across all models, Strong
Dissension has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. The results from Models (1)
and (2) imply that the concern we brought up that less profitable firms might dominate the main
result of this study is not valid. Similarly, the results from Models (3) and (4) confirm that it is
not possible to argue that only a firm having outside board of directors as a majority member has
more chance to have better firm performance.
As another robustness test, we analyze the relation between dissension and firm
performance after matching the firms using Propensity Score Matching. This approach addresses
whether firms having specific characteristics have more chance to receive outside directors’
dissension that leads to higher firm performance. We consider two groups of firms by dissension
occurrence and generate a sample of matched firms considering firm characteristics including
firm size, profitability, and capital structure. As shown in Table 5, most firm characteristics and
governance characteristics are different between the group having dissensions (i.e., treatment
group) and the group not having dissensions (i.e., control group) before the matching; firm size,
leverage, board size, and the ratio of outside board of directors are statistically different. In
contrast, for the sample of matched firms, there is no statistical difference in the characteristics
between the treatment group and the control group. Results from OLS regression show that the
marginal effect of outside board of directors’ dissension is still positive and statistically
significant on Tobin’s Q. This latter result confirms that the main findings of this study are
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consistent, and conclude that outside board of directors’ dissension has a positive marginal effect
on firm performance.

5. Summary and discussion
This study investigates the benefits of corporate governance practices as a protection tool
for shareholders’ wealth. Prior studies suggest that better corporate governance is positively
associated with fewer agency problems and greater principals’ wealth. Most public firms have a
board of director system as one of corporate governance mechanisms, which enable them to
protect principals and reduce agency problems. However, there is a weakness in the rationale that
outside board of directors would monitor managers well. This rationale is based on the
assumption that independent boards of directors are likely to have different interests from
managers. Thus, the empirical results from these prior studies rely on both making such an
assumption and a particular definition of board independence. As pointed in previous studies, the
definition of independence is truly arbitrary and possibly changes empirical results (Hwang and
Kim, 2009). These two major weaknesses of previous empirical studies are basically due to a
lack or restricted access to directors’ real activity information. In general, directors’ activities in
the board meeting room are not public. Furthermore, it is impossible in practice to measure
individual directors’ interests or utility, and categorize them into groups of “independent” and
“not independent.” To the best of our knowledge, only a few countries (e.g., Korea and China)
make boards of directors’ real activities public. We hand-collected board-meeting data from
Korean public firms between FY2010 and FY2014 to use in this study. By doing so, we can
avoid these two major challenges encountered in corporate governance empirical studies.
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This study provides evidence that outside directors play a monitoring role using their
votes; results from the main and robustness regressions reveal that outside directors’ dissension
is associated with higher firm performance. Not only do this study find supportive evidence of
the outside directors’ monitoring role without assuming that they have conflicting interests with
managers, they are independent, or they are expert in finance or accounting, but results in this
study also show the effectiveness of the monitoring activities. This study compares and contrasts
the aggressiveness of monitoring activities of outside board of directors, strong dissension vs.
mild dissension. We report that dissension is a very rare event and strong dissension tends to
have a meaningful positive impact on firm performance, implying that it is difficult for an
outside director to vote against proposals and suggesting that only strong dissension can mitigate
agency problems. Our empirical finding supports why firms should have outside directors on the
board, which is consistent with the recent policy makers’ directions.
We contribute to the financial management literature that discusses agency issues and
corporate governance and open up for future research. All the empirical results point out that
outside board of directors’ monitoring activity plays an important role in corporate governance,
which is consistent with prior theoretical and empirical studies. We show that it is possible to
provide such evidence without the previously mentioned strong assumption and arbitrary
definitions of independence because the sample represents real voting activities of outside board
of directors toward managers’ proposals. Another value of this sample is that it provides a
spectrum of outside board of directors’ voting activities ranging from clear approval to clear
disapproval with a six-level scale of Agree, Agree with condition, Agree after change, Hold,
Withdraw, or Disagree on each item proposed by managerial directors on every agenda. Using
outside directors’ dissension, a new opinion-based proxy for outside board of directors’
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monitoring activity, is an important approach for corporate governance empirical studies in two
respects. First, it allows to show the effect of outside board of directors’ decision-making on
each agenda, which is not possible using the traditional binary variables representing directors’
characteristics, such as financial or/and accounting expertise, education, work experience, and/or
social activities. Second, this proxy contains dynamic changes; individual directors can cast a
dissenting vote on a specific agenda in a specific period. However, directors might not make the
same decision on a similar agenda in a different period; under the traditional binary variables, it
is not possible to account for such real changes. We consider these two features of the new
opinion-based proxy as valuable for future research when more years of data will be available.
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Appendix A
Distribution on dissented proposals
Panel A. Dissension by Agenda
Type of Agenda

Number of Dissensions

Percentage of Dissensions

Investments

40

34.2%

Financing

21

17.9%

Personnel Appointment

4

3.4%

Internal Governance

13

11.1%

Financial Reporting

1

0.9%

Legal

5

4.3%

Shareholder Meeting

3

2.6%

Budgeting

3

2.6%

Strategy

8

6.8%

Related Party Transaction

4

3.4%

Contracting

5

4.3%

Other

10

8.5%

117

100.0%

Year

Number of Dissensions

Percentage of Dissensions

2010

21

17.9%

2011

31

26.5%

2012

28

23.9%

2013

19

16.2%

2014

18

15.4%

Total

117

100.0%

Total
Panel B. Dissension by Agenda
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Appendix B
List of firms with dissension
Firm Name

Year of Dissension

Number of Dissensions

AHNLAB CO LTD

2012

1

AHNLAB CO LTD

2013

1

CELLTRION PHARM INC

2012

1

CHUNGDAHM LEARNING INC

2011

1

DAELIM INDUSTRIAL CO LTD

2013

1

DAEWOO INTERNATIONAL CORP

2010

1

DAEWOO INTERNATIONAL CORP

2011

1

DAEWOO INTERNATIONAL CORP

2012

1

DAEWOO INTERNATIONAL CORP

2013

1

DAEWOO INTERNATIONAL CORP

2014

2

DAEWOO SHIPBUILDING & MARINE

2011

1

DAEWOO SHIPBUILDING & MARINE

2013

1

DAEWOO SHIPBUILDING & MARINE

2014

3

DAUM KAKAO CORP

2013

1

DONGKUK STEEL MILL CO LTD

2011

1

DONGYANG EXPRESS CORP

2011

2

E TEC E&C CO LTD

2014

1

HANDSOME CORP

2014

1

HUSTEEL CO LTD

2012

1

HYUNDAI CORP

2010

1

HYUNDAI ENGR & CONSTR CO

2012

1

HYUNDAI ENGR & CONSTR CO

2014

1

HYUNDAI HEAVY INDS CO LTD

2012

1

HYUNDAI HYSCO CO LTD

2013

1

INSUN ENVIRONMENTAL NEW TECH

2012

2

INTERGIS CO LTD

2014

1

KOREA AEROSPACE IND LTD

2013

1

KOREA DISTRICT HEATING CORP

2010

3

KOREA DISTRICT HEATING CORP

2011

2

KOREA ELECTRIC POWER IND DEV

2012

2

KOREA ELECTRIC POWER IND DEV

2013

1

(continued on next page)
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Firm Name

Year of Dissension

Number of Dissensions

KOREA GAS CORP

2010

5

KOREA GAS CORP

2011

3

KOREA GAS CORP

2012

2

KOREA LINE CORP

2011

1

KOREA PETRO CHEMICAL IND CO

2012

1

KT CORP

2010

1

KT CORP

2011

1

KT CORP

2012

2

KT CORP

2014

1

KT SKYLIFE CO LTD

2012

1

KT SKYLIFE CO LTD

2013

1

KT SKYLIFE CO LTD

2014

3

KT&G CORP

2010

5

KT&G CORP

2014

1

KUMHO PETROCHEMICAL CO LTD

2010

1

KUMHO PETROCHEMICAL CO LTD

2011

1

LG ELECTRONICS INC

2013

1

LG INNOTEK CO LTD

2013

1

LOTTE HIMART CO LTD

2012

1

LOTTE SHOPPING CO

2013

1

MEGASTUDY CO LTD

2014

1

NEPES CORPORATION LTD

2012

1

OCI CO LTD

2012

1

PHARMICELL CO LTD

2012

1

POSCO

2012

1

POSCO

2013

2

POSCO ICT CO LTD

2010

1

POSCO ICT CO LTD

2011

3

POSCO ICT CO LTD

2012

1

POSCO ICT CO LTD

2013

1

SAMYANG FOODS CO LTD

2011

1

SAMYANG FOODS CO LTD

2014

1

SEOUL BROADCASTING SYSTEM CO

2011

2

SK HYNIX INC

2010

2

SK HYNIX INC

2011

4

SK HYNIX INC

2012

1

SK INNOVATION CO LTD

2011

1

(continued on next page)
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Firm Name

Year of Dissension

Number of Dissensions

SK NETWORKS CO LTD

2010

1

SK NETWORKS CO LTD

2012

1

SK NETWORKS CO LTD

2013

1

SK TELECOM CO LTD

2011

1

S-OIL CORP

2012

1

SPORTS SEOUL CO LTD

2011

1

SSANGYONG MOTOR CO LTD

2011

4

SSANGYONG MOTOR CO LTD

2012

3

SSANGYONG MOTOR CO LTD

2013

1

SSANGYONG MOTOR CO LTD

2014

1

STX CORP CO LTD

2013

1

TLI INC

2014

1

TONGYANG CEMENT & ENERGY COR

2013

1

Total Number of Dissensions

117
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Table 1
Definition of variables
Panel A. Dissension variables

Definition

Dissension

A binary variable equal to one if the firm has a dissension from
outside director(s), and zero otherwise.
Dissension indicates one of disagree, withdraw, hold in outside
directors’ vote, or one of additional opinions, such as agreement
with condition or agreement after changes, rather than just agree.

Strong Dissension

A binary variable equal to one if the firm has a strong dissension
from outside director(s), and zero otherwise.
Strong dissension indicates one of disagree, withdraw, or hold in
outside directors’ vote.

Mild Dissension

A binary variable equal to one if the firm has a mild dissension
from outside director(s), and zero otherwise.
Mild dissension indicates one of agreement with condition or
agreement after changes, but not opposition.

Panel B. Firm performance

Definition

Tobin’s Q

Market value of common stock and book value of preferred stock
and debt, divided by book value of assets

Market-to-Book ratio

Market value of equity divided by book value of equity

Panel C. Control variables

Definition

Size

Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets

ROA

Net income divided by total assets

Leverage

Debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt, divided by total
assets

Board Size

The number of all board directors

Outside Director Ratio

Number of outsiders divided by the number of directors

Table 2
Univariate tests

Observations
Tobin Q
Market to Book
Size = ln(Total Assets)
ROA
Leverage
Board Size
Outside Director Ratio

With Dissension

No Dissension

81
2.478
1.478
14.883
0.019
0.302
7.852
0.515

2,599
2.268
1.243
12.845
0.013
0.255
5.697
0.370

Differences
(With - No)

t-statistics

0.210*
0.235**
2.038***
0.006
0.047**
2.155***
0.145***

1.476
1.663
9.619
0.792
2.279
7.433
8.599

Table 2 exhibits univariate results indicating differences in means of sample characteristics by group of
dissension occurrence. The With Dissension group consists of individual firms incurring dissension
during the given fiscal year. The No Dissension group represents the firms without dissension during the
fiscal year. Detailed definitions of all variables are in Table 1. The symbols ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3
Outside director dissension and firm performance
Dependent variable:
Model:
Dissension
Strong Dissension

Tobin’s Q
(1)
0.476***
(0.132)

(2)

0.530***
(0.152)

(3)

(4)

(5)
0.473***
(0.131)

Market-to-Book ratio
(6)
(7)

(8)

0.524***
0.536***
0.533***
(0.159)
(0.151)
(0.156)
Mild Dissension
0.197
0.051
0.173
0.025
(0.129)
(0.141)
(0.127)
(0.139)
Sizet-1
-0.226*** -0.224*** -0.221*** -0.224***
-0.200***
-0.198*** -0.195*** -0.198***
(0.029)
(0.029)
(0.030)
(0.029)
(0.024)
(0.025)
(0.025)
(0.025)
ROAt-1
-0.779*
-0.776*
-0.799*
-0.776*
-0.690
-0.687
-0.710*
-0.687
(0.466)
(0.466)
(0.467)
(0.466)
(0.424)
(0.425)
(0.425)
(0.425)
Leveraget-1
0.358*
0.364**
0.371*
0.363*
0.365*
0.371**
0.378**
0.370**
(0.208)
(0.208)
(0.208)
(0.208)
(0.187)
(0.187)
(0.187)
(0.187)
Board Size
0.555***
0.558***
0.564***
0.558***
0.499***
0.502***
0.509***
0.502***
(0.114)
(0.114)
(0.114)
(0.114)
(0.098)
(0.098)
(0.098)
(0.098)
Outside Director Ratio
0.480
0.488*
0.500*
0.486*
0.436*
0.445*
0.457*
0.444*
(0.292)
(0.292)
(0.293)
(0.292)
(0.262)
(0.262)
(0.263)
(0.262)
Constant
3.904***
3.861***
3.813***
3.867***
2.651***
2.609***
2.557***
2.612***
(0.310)
(0.306)
(0.309)
(0.310)
(0.265)
(0.262)
(0.264)
(0.246)
Year/Industry FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Number of Observations
2,680
2,680
2,680
2,680
2,680
2,680
2,680
2,680
Adj. R-Squared (%)
9.43
9.44
9.18
9.41
11.01
11.03
10.69
11.00
Table 3 reports OLS results showing the relation between firm performance and outside director dissension. Firm performance is Tobin’s Q for
Models (1) to (4) and Market-to-Book ratio for Models (5) to (8). Outside director dissension is Dissension, Strong Dissension, or Mild
Dissension. Detailed definitions of all variables are in Table 1. All models include year and industry fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are
heteroskedasticity robust (i.e., White-Huber) standard errors. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.

Table 4
Sub-sample analyses
Dependent variable:
Model:

Tobin’s Q
(1)

(2)

(3)
(4)
Profitability
Outside Director
High
Low
Majority
Non-Majority
Strong Dissension
0.707***
0.485**
0.382**
0.757**
(0.223)
(0.227)
(0.183)
(0.304)
Mild Dissension
-0.057
0.191
-0.001
0.863***
(0.244)
(0.187)
(0.146)
(0.271)
Sizet-1
-0.092***
-0.328***
-0.146***
-0.323***
(0.033)
(0.047)
(0.036)
(0.047)
ROAt-1
1.969**
-2.000***
0.812
-1.103**
(0.899)
(0.626)
(0.864)
(0.541)
Leveraget-1
0.681**
0.670**
0.564*
0.481**
(0.273)
(0.313)
(0.381)
(0.242)
Board Size
0.474***
0.518***
-0.124
0.699***
(0.118)
(0.178)
(0.200)
(0.135)
Outside Director Ratio
0.043
0.827*
1.134
-0.421
(0.352)
(0.458)
(1.162)
(0.574)
Intercept
2.458***
4.801***
3.657***
5.110***
(0.398)
(0.479)
(0.740)
(0.560)
Year/Industry FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Number of Observations
1,338
1,342
685
1,995
Adj. R-Squared (%)
10.28
13.06
11.79
11.13
Table 4 reports OLS results showing the relation between Strong Dissension and Firm Performance for a
group of firms having higher profitability and a group of firms having lower profitability in Models (1)
and (2), and for a group of firms where outside directors are majority and a group of firms where outside
directors are minority in Models (3) and (4). The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. Detailed definitions of
all variables are in Table 1. Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity robust (i.e., White-Huber)
standard errors. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.

Table 5
Propensity Score Matching
Treatment

b

Before Matching
Control
Differences

Strong Dissension

Treatment

b

After Matching a
Control
Differences

OLS

0.372*
(0.201)
Mild Dissension
0.132
(0.300)
Sizet-1
14.398
12.872
1.526***
14.398
14.417
-0.019
-0.156
(0.100)
ROAt-1
0.016
0.013
0.003
0.016
0.019
-0.003
-0.089
(3.160)
Leveraget-1
0.292
0.256
0.037**
0.292
0.306
-0.014
-0.921
(0.909)
Board Size
7.393
5.724
1.669***
7.393
6.984
-0.410
-0.091
(0.469)
Outside Director Ratio
0.487
0.372
0.115***
0.487
0.463
0.024
0.078
(1.336)
Constant
5.114***
(1.177)
Year/Industry FE
Yes
Number of Observations
61
2,619
61
61
122
Adj. R-Squared (%)
39.70
Table 5 reports propensity score matching analyses of the effect of Strong Dissension on Firm Performance. The dependent variable of the OLS
regression is Tobin’s Q. Detailed definitions of all variables are in Table 1. Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity robust (i.e., WhiteHuber) standard errors. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
a. Sample Matched based on firm characteristics: Size, ROA, and Leverage
b. Treatment: Strong Dissension.
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